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CONTINUING TRIBUTES TO THE
HONORABLE RICHARD A. POSNER
PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC LAW:
RICHARD A. POSNER'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO
FAMILY LAW AND POLICY
Francesco Parisi and Ben W.F. Depoorter*
Judge Richard A. Posner's academic writings touched several issues
originating much debate and controversy, often not immediately for the
conclusions reached, but for the methodology followed. Posner's seminal
work on the "market for adoptions," the enforcement of surrogate
motherhood and the economics of human sexuality are examples of the
variety of economic analysis studying issues traditionally considered
outside the domain of economics.
In this brief essay, we examine some of Posner's representative writings
on the economics of family law and some of his responses to the
substantive objections and methodological criticisms moved by legal
scholars to Posner's work in the field. Most of the criticisms concern the
proper role of economic analysis in the analysis of non-market realities
such as the family. In considering this debate, Part I examines some
representative samples of Posner's rich research on the economics of
family law and relates it to the state of legal and economic research on the
issue. Part II discusses the limits of economic analysis in the field of
family law and policy with special attention to Posner's writings in
relation to the critical issues of externalities and commodification. We
underscore the importance of a clear understanding of the positive theory
of law and economics and relate Judge Posner's family law writings to his
proposed normative theory of law. We conclude briefly, discussing the
difficult boundaries of private autonomy and public intervention.
* Francesco Parisi, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law
& Co-Director, J.M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Program in
Economics and the Law. Ben W.F. Depoorter, Research Fellow LEC, George
Mason University School of Law and Assistant Professor of Law, Center of
Advanced Studies in Law and Economics, Ghent University, School of Law.
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I. RICHARD POSNER AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO FAMILY
LAW
Starting in the early 1970s, the pioneering work of Richard Posner and
a handful of other scholars brought to light the pervasive relevance of
economics in virtually all areas of substantive and procedural law. The
work of Posner and other scholars, often identified as the "new" law and
economics movement, applied economic analysis beyond the traditional
domain of markets, showing that beyond the apparent fragmentation of
legal rules and doctrines lies a coherent and unifying framework with
which to approach legal problems.
The new law and economics movement brought about a true
methodological revolution, applying economic models to study non-
market phenomena, including areas such as family and health law. In the
origin, traditional legal scholars were skeptical of the use of economic
analysis in these areas of the law and criticized the new law and economics
movement for challenging fundamental legal dogmas and encroaching
upon the very core of traditional legal method.
But unquestionably, economic analysis proved to be a valuable
instrument analyzing these issues and the analytical power of the
economic tools was exponentially greater when new legal issues came to
the attention of courts and policymakers. Economic analysis would
provide a key to the understanding of the likely impact of alternative legal
rules on human behavior and larger social realities.
Richard Posner's contribution to the field of law and economics is
exceptional, not in the least for the boundless scope of its applications,
ranging from the history and evolution of legal systems to the study of
substantive, procedural, and constitutional doctrines. Richard Posner has
written thirty books and more than 300 articles and review essays,I
standing, by a good measure, as the single most productive scholar in the
law and economics discipline.
Since the early 1970s, Posner's writings demonstrate the analytical
power of using microeconomics to understand relationships and
phenomena beyond the explicit markets that had been considered by
neoclassical economists. This rethinking of law and economics
1. The reader not afraid of a humbling confrontation might consider
consulting Judge Posner's publication list published in the past issue of this
journal, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y xli-lxx (2000) or on-line at the
University of Chicago web site, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
faculty/posnerjr/publications.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2001).
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methodology extended to several other related disciplines, such as the
study of social norms and customs, long-term relationships, family, and
other social institutions.
Posner's admirable intellectual mission is most remarkable in light of
his 1981 appointment as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. In spite of his most successful judicial career, and his
administrative responsibilities as Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,' Posner's activity as an academic scholar
has been extremely prolific and influential.
Under different circumstances it would be proper to review the
relevant work of a celebrated scholar in a specific field . However, the
large production of Richard Posner deters any such ambition for the
present authors. Rather than attempting a summary review of his work
on the subject, we shall comply with the task commissioned to us and
confine our brief observations to the insights that Posner's work provides
on the changing boundaries of family law, for an understanding of the
uneasy tension between individual freedom and public values in family
law.
A. The Insular Domain of Family Law
Both in law and in economics the family has traditionally been an
isolated subject of study. Within legal science issues of the family were
treated separately from other legal areas and concepts At the same
2. Posner ranked first among his peers for the number of signed opinions per
year, with a record of over fifty opinions per year. See William M. Landes,
Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of
Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 303 (1998). Posner's
record extends to the influence of his judicial views across the United States.
According to recent statistics, Posner ranked first among all Federal Courts of
Appeal judges for the overall influence of his opinions outside of his judicial
circuit. Id.
3. A recent study on the most influential and cited legal scholars ranked
Richard A. Posner as the single most cited of the legal scholar of our time,
surpassing the cumulative citations (1956-to date) of jurisprudential giants such as
Roscoe Pound and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The reported citations give
Richard A. Posner a substantial lead, with approximately twice as many citations
as his closest competitors. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 409 (2000).
4. See POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW: THE COLLECTED
ECONOMIC ESSAYS OF RICHARD A. POSNER (Francesco Parisi ed., 2001).
5. See Margaret Brinig, Parent and Child, in DE GEEST AND BOUCKEART,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 253 (2000). Margaret Brinig ascribes
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time, economic theory regarded issues of the family as insular from the
market. In law, the boundary between the family and the market has
traditionally been described as a conceptual separation between status
and contract,6 where in economics a difference perceived between
altruistic and self-interested motivations of behavior dominated views on,
respectively, the family and the market
Historically, the family as a study subject of economics has been limited
8to treating the family as a basic unit in studies of consumption behavior.
More recently, new law and economics and new economic theory of the
family has shifted its approach to focus on relationships within the family
structure. For the past thirty years, economic analysis of law has been
applied to a wide range of family issues, including fertility behavior
among women,9 optimal divorce laws, '0 divorce law and impact on child
this to historical and formalistic reasons: "[T]he rules governing marital
separations and parental obligations developed before modern contract and tort
theories, and they developed in a separate (ecclesiastical) system of courts...
[u]nder the influence of formalism, theories of civil obligation focused on the
prerequisites for liability." Id.
6. SIR HENRY SUMMER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (10th ed. 1884) ("The
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status
to Contract."), cited in Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and
the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 991 (1995).
7. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991) ( Adam Smith),
cited in Estin, supra note 6.
8. For an example, see MARGARET G. REID, ECONOMICS OF HOUSEHOLD
PRODUCTION (1934).
9. These studies relate the declining birth rate in Western society to technical
but also legal changes such as expansion of the right of privacy with regard to the
use of contraceptives and abortion choice. See BECKER, supra note 7; Gary S.
Becker & Gregg H. Lewis, On the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality of
Children, 2 J. POL. ECON. 297 (1973); Gary S. Becker & Nigel Tomes, Child
Endowments Between the Quantity and the Quality of Children, 84 J. POL. ECON.
143 (1988). Others have linked the trend of declining birth rates to no-fault
divorce. See Margaret F. Brining & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and
Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 885-86 (1994) (finding a negative and
significant effect between no-fault divorce and birth rate and the increased
economic costs in having children in combination with relaxed divorce laws and
stigma); Gary S. Becker, Elisabeth M. Landes & Robert Michael, An Economic
Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1157-76 (1977).
10. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD.
35 (1978); Ira Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1990) (applying
contract damages-theory to divorce law); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and
Quasi-Rents; Or "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life", 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 167
(1987) (arguing against flexible divorce laws which may negate marriage-specific
Private Choices and Public Law
upbringing," legal rules and their influence on birth rates, foster care,
the impact of welfare subsidies for illegitimacy and single motherhood, 3
the fiduciary role of parents, 14 the effect of consent revocation legislation
on adoption rates 5 and many other topics.
In this manner, new economic theory of the family has extended our
ways of thinking about and understanding family relationships. These
applications of economic thinking to what was traditionally considered to
be a self-contained field of law has often elicited opposition from various
angles.
B. Richard A. Posner's Writings on the Economics of the Family
Law and Sexuality
Much of Posner's work on the economics of private law can be viewed
as an application of his well-known efficiency hypothesis of the common
law. 6 In most of his work, Posner contributes to economic analysis by
investment made during marriage); Margaret F. Brinig, The Law and Economics
of No-Fault Divorce: A Review of No-Fault Divorce, 26 FAM L.Q. 453 (1993) (the
role of no-fault on decreasing divorce rates); MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 125 (1993) (arguing in favor of expectation damages
to suppress opportunistic abandonment dependant spouses); Margaret F. Brinig
and June R. Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 68 TUL. L.
REV. 855 (1988) (describing a model of restitution). For an overview of the
literature see Anthony W. Dnes, Marriage Contracts, 864 in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 864 (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit de Geest, eds.,
2000).
11. See, e.g., Yoram Weiss and Robert J. Willis, Children as Collective Goods
and Divorce Settlements, 3 J. LABOR ECONOMICS 268 (1985); Gary M. Anderson &
Robert D. Tollison, A Rational Theory of Childhood, 2 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 199
(describing marriage as a "first-best" for childrearing).
12. See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 5, at 243-47 (for an overview of the literature
and application of the economic framework of the principal-agent relationship).
13. Margaret F. Brinig and Francis H. Buckley, A Market for Deadbeats, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 201 (1996).
14. Elisabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2401 (1995).
15. See Brinig, supra note 10 (indicating the relationship between revocation
statutes and adoption rates).
16. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 534-535 (1996);
Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Richard A. Posner, A
Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1
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formulating and testing the hypothesis that the common law is best
explained as the courts' attempt to promote economic efficiency. The
common law of torts and contracts are natural areas for applying Posner's
positive economic analysis, which focuses on what the law is and why it is
shaped that way. In each area of jurisprudence, economics can provide
powerful insight into what makes the legal rules beneficial, what the
controversies are, and why various laws developed. For instance, the
economic theory of torts 7 explains why different rules are efficient, what
effects they have on the behavior of parties, and how legislative
interventions often affect the results produced by the common law. The
• • 18
economic theory of contracts provides similar insights.
Besides these classic applications, Posner's contribution to the field of
law and economics should be singled out for its novel application of
economic analysis to areas that were traditionally thought to be out of the
reach of the discipline. Posner's work on family law serves as a good
example. Posner. convincingly has shown that economics can be applied
to the market for adopting children in order to get a clearer
understanding of the problematic issue of why few babies are currently
put up for adoption.' 9 Having understood the market for babies, one
quickly can grasp the impact of the current regulation on society and the
goals we might have concerning adoption. Along similar lines, Posner
unveils the analytical power of economics in his discussion of divorce,2
presenting an ethical and economic analysis of contracts of surrogate
motherhood,2 rape,22 pornography," and the economic ramification of
(1994).
17. WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).
18. For an overview, see Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theories in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL. III. THE REGULATION OF
CONTRACTS 1 (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).
19. Elizabeth Landes and Richard Posner, The Economics of Baby Shortage,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978) [hereinafter Baby Shortage] and Richard Posner, The
Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987); [hereinafter
Adoption Regulation]; for a more brief treatment of the subject see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 5.4, at 139-43 (3d ed. 1986).
20. POSNER, supra note 10, at Chapter 5.
21. Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of
Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 2 (1989) [hereinafter
Surrogacy].
22. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1193 (1985).
23. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 351-382 (1992) [hereinafter SEX
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various tenets of the feminist movement;" an essay on law and nature
presenting an economic approach to homosexuality, 5 sex preference, and
family law; the demand for human cloning;16 a survey of cross-cultural
differences in sexual and family relationships; 7 and, with his engaging
book on the relevance of economic logic in understanding human
sexuality and family behavior. While recognizing that sexual drives and
orientations have a strong biological origin, Posner contends that sexual
behavior is rationally driven by an implicit calculation of the perceived
costs and benefits of specific actions. Economics, in Posner's view,
provides a unifying account of the various perspectives on the family and
on sexuality, including biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and
29philosophy.
AND REASON].
24. Richard A. Posner, The Radical Feminist Critique of "Sex and Reason", 25
CONN. L. REV. 515 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989
University of Chicago Legal Forum 191; Richard A. Posner, Remarks on "Women
in the Legal Struggle over the Public/Private Divide" (March 1998) (on file with
author).
25. Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Homosexuality, in SEX,
PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 173 (David M. Estlund
and Martha C. Nussbaum eds. 1997); POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 23,
291-323 (on the policy debate on homosexuality).
26. Eric A. Posner and Richard A. Posner, The Demand for Human Cloning,
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 579 (1999).
27. Gary S. Becker and Richard A. Posner, Cross-Cultural Differences in
Family and Sexual Life: An Economic Analysis, 5 RATIONALITY & Soc. 421
(1993).
28. SEX AND REASON, supra note 23.
29. SEX AND REASON provides a good example of the manner in which each
publication of Posner sets an industry of book xeview, critical notes and dissenting
articles in motion. See, e.g.,. Martha Nussbaum, Only Grey Matter? Richard
Posner's Cost-Benefit Analysis of Sex, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1689 (1992); Gillian K.
Hadfield, Book Review: Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics
of Sexual Man, 106 HARV. L. REV. 479 (1992); Margaret Chon, Book Review: Sex
Stories-A Review of Sex and Reason, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 162 (1993); Martha
Ertman, Review Essay: Denying the Secret of Joy: A Critique of Posner's Theory of
Sexuality, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1485 (1993); Robert P. George, Book Review: Can Sex
be Reasonable? Sex and Reason. By Richard A. Posner, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 783
(1993); Chris Hutton, Sex and Reason: A Review and Application of Judge
Posner's Theory, 38 S.D. L. REV. 1 (1993); Robin West, Review Essay: Sex,
Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413 (1993); Martin Zelder,
Incompletely Reasoned Sex: A Review of Posner's Somewhat Misleading Guide to
The Economic Analysis of Sex and Family Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1584 (1993);
Francis C.F. Chang, Book Review: Disguised Subjectivity: Posner's Economic
20011
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Although Posner admits that economics might not be conclusive, as
critical moral questions often stand in the way of a definitive resolution of
all these issues, his analysis shows how economics can help streamline the
debate and provide an objective common ground to evaluate the opposing
claims.
In the following sections, we will consider some of Posner's most
controversial applications of economic analysis to areas of family and
sexuality.
1. The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions
In one of the most controversial articles in the whole field of law and
economics,0 Landes and Posner apply the conceptual tools of economic
analysis to the adoption process as an example of public regulation of
non-market behavior.31 They develop a model of the supply and demand
for adopting babies under the existing pattern of regulation, showing how
it has created a baby shortage and a black market for adoptable infants by
preventing the achievement of a more natural market equilibrium. If
there were balance in the demand and the supply of babies for adoption,
our society would have avoided the glut of unadopted children
maintained in foster homes at public expense. But restrictions, the most
significant of which is the regulation of the price at which adoption
Analysis of Sex, 5 CRiM. L.F. 733 (1994). Empirical surveys on the positive
correlation between Posner's writing and employment in academic scholarship is
not available as of yet.
30. As Brinig notes: "Baby selling became code for the foolish extreme to
which its proponents would carry law and economics." Brinig, Parent and Child,
supra note 5; referring to John J. Donahue III and Ian Ayres, Posner's Third
Symphony: Thinking about the Unthinkable, 39 STAN. L. REV. 791; Mark G.
Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and the Ideology of the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 688 n.51 (1979). See Adam Prichard, A Market
for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 347-57 (1984); see also Boston University
Law Review January, 1987 Forum: Adoption and Market Theory gathering
comments by Ronald A. Cass, Coping with Life, Law, and Market: A Comment on
Posner and the Law-and-Economics Debate, 67 B.U. L. REV. 75 (1987); Jane
Maslow Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REV. 105 (1987) and
T. Frankel and Francis H. Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to
Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 101 (1987). For discussions of the "baby selling"
article by the popular press see, e.g., Barrett, Influential Ideas: A Movement Called
'Law and Economics' Sways Legal Circles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1;
McDaniel, Free-Market Jurist, NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1985, at 93-94; Arthur L.
Caplan, Meet Richard Posner, the Judge Who Would Sell Homeless Babies, WASH.
POST NAT'L WEEKLY ED. (Commentary), Oct. 29, 1984, at 23.
31. Baby Shortage, supra note 19.
Private Choices and Public Law
agencies may transact with the natural parents, prevent the natural
functioning of the market.
While the "selling" of babies32 may seem highly objectionable, it
already takes place-legally.3 3 Adoption agencies essentially "sell" babies
to adoptive parents by making them incur costs, usually associated with
the maze of regulations involved in adopting babies. This is especially
true for healthy white babies, who are in short supply when compared to
non-white, older, or disabled children. Given such reality, Landes and
Posner advocate a partial deregulation of the existing adoption
34mechanisms, which would eliminate the shortage of babies. Like any
other market, a market for adoption would reach a market clearing
equilibrium with the number of babies demanded gradually approaching
the number of babies supplied by society, a result currently impeded by
existing government regulation. 3' According to Landes and Posner, such a
balance would be beneficial because it would mean that parents who
place little value in their offspring would be more likely to give the child
up for adoption, and adoptive parents who really want to have a child of
their own would be able to get one. This market-driven adoption
mechanism would much more effectively put babies in homes where the
children are most valued than the current system.
• 36
One objection to deregulation is that it might result in such high prices
32. Posner repeatedly reminds us of the fact that the subject at hand is not the
sale of the baby itself, but rather of the parental right with regard to the baby - a
contract that lasts a maximum eighteen or twenty-one years. See SEX AND
REASON, supra note 23, at 410. While both rights may seems interwoven,
especially at a young age of the child, the difference becomes more apparent with
the progress of years. Indeed, parents will be able to testify that in discussions on
issues such as appropriate bed time hours, our own children go to great lengths to
clarify that we do not "own" them.
33. See Christine Bachrach, Adoption as a Means of Family Formation: Data
from the National Survey of Family Growth, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 859 (1983).
The analytical model of the present market of adoptions, as presented in Landes
and Posner 's original offering has to this date stayed largely uncontested. Baby
Shortage, supra note 19, at 327-339.
34. See Baby Shortage, supra note 19, at 339-41.
35. See id. at 327-39.
36. Ronald Cass examined the various types of objections to the proposal for
a deregulated market for adoptions. He was able to infer the following categories:
Disagreement over the practical effects of the proposal (consequential-internal),
objections with regard to third-party effects not accounted for in the proposal
(consequential-external), arguments that anticipate perverse effects from the
symbolism of market choice (symbolic-consequential) and finally, principled
objections against market vocabulary into issues such as adoption and abortion;
2001]
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for babies that only the wealthy would be able to adopt.37 Posner argues
that the natural forces of the market would yield lower prices as a result
of competition, just like it does in any other market.38 A second objection
to deregulation is that the welfare of the child should be the primary
concern. While this concern is certainly valid, there is no reason that it
cannot be taken into account in a deregulated process. Indeed, there are
limitations to the deregulation that would take place under the proposal.
For instance, Posner does not support specific performance in
circumstances in which it appears that forcing the sale would harm the
baby.39 In addition, the proposal would prohibit the sale of a child after
infancy (i.e., after a bond has been established with the parents).40
Allowing the sale of non-infants might become an incentive to parents to
sell their children after the young ones have already formed an
attachment with them, which is certainly undesirable because of the
traumatic effect it would have on the children involved. However, with
regard to babies, there is no reason to believe that a market system would
be any worse at finding good parents than the current system. In fact,
there are a number of reasons to believe that it would be better.
The objection to deregulation of the adoption market on the grounds
that it would occasion welfare losses for children is more convincing with
regard to hard-to-place babies. To the extent that these babies are
substitutes for white, healthy babies, the artificially created price increase
by regulation may lead some couples to consider adopting the excess
supply of hard-to-place babies. Although it is hard to estimate the precise
effect, the price reduction for healthy, white babies can be expected to
decrease the number of placements of difficult-to-place babies.4'
Cass, supra note 30, at 75-76. The first objection presented in this section belongs
to the former category of consequential-internal objections. The second belongs to
the consequential-external type. We will discuss symbolic objections in Section 6.
37. See, e.g., Frankel and Tamar, supra note 30, at 99.
38. Baby Shortage, supra note 19, at 339-40. In fact the high prices are
primarily a property of the black market for adoption. See Posner, Adoption
Regulation, supra note 19, at 65. Furthermore, presently wealthy people fare
better under the current system of adoption agency-controlled legal adoptions,
since economic status of the prospective adopting couple is taken into account in
the selection process of the agencies.
39. Adoption Regulation, supra note 19, at 67.
40. Id. at 66.
41. Id. Posner objects to this argument which he deems to be a "covert"
method of encouraging the adoption of hard-to-place children. Posner writes:
[I]f society wants to subsidize these unfortunate children, the burden of
the subsidies should be borne, if not by the natural parents of these
Private Choices and Public Law
2. The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of
Surrogate Motherhood
In surrogate motherhood contracts, a woman agrees to be impregnated
through artificial insemination and gives up the child to the father for a
fee. In an article published in this Journal, Posner focused on the
question of whether such contracts should be legally enforceable. 42 An
analysis of social welfare leads one to an elementary conclusion: Parties
contract only when they both believe that they will be made better off.
This principle is no less true in contracts of surrogate motherhood than
with any other contract. Parties to this kind of contract believe, at least
beforehand, that they will both mutually benefit and these advantages
depend on the legal enforcement of the contract. If it is not enforceable,
either party can change his or her mind and deprive the other of the
expected benefits. Freedom of contract suggests that women should be
free to rent their reproductive systems if they like. If one wants to argue
that surrogate mothers should not be allowed to do so, the only basis
would be to say that surrogates do not have the objectivity to put a value
43their services.
This view might have some validity if surrogates were all driven by
extreme poverty to make the contract. It would suggest that society do
something to ameliorate their situation beyond simply allowing them to
sell their only marketable asset. However, this possible objection to
surrogate contracts does not seem to be supported by the evidence, and
therefore there is no good reason to bar the practice, at least if evaluated
within the narrow confines of this analytical criterion. Also, regret over
giving up the child is at least partially balanced by empathy for the
father's infertile wife. In looking at alternative approaches, Posner notes
that a rule which allows surrogate mothers to change their minds after the
birth of the child might be acceptable, but it would lower the value of the
service because the couple purchasing would have to be compensated for
the uncertainty. For these reasons, it seems as though it would be in the
children, then by the taxpaying population at large-rather than by just
the nation's childless white couples, who under the present unsystematic
system bear the lion's share of the burden by being denied the benefits of
an efficient method of allocating healthy white infants for adoption in the
hope that this will induce them to adopt nonwhite, handicapped, or older
children.
Id.
42. Posner, Surrogacy, supra note 21.
43. See Cohen, supra note 30; Carl E. Schneider, Surrogate Motherhood from
the Perspective of Family Law, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 125 (1990).
2001]
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best interest of the parties to make these agreements enforceable, just as
with any other contract."
Numerous objections have been raised to contracts of surrogate
motherhood, including the detrimental effects on third parties, the
supposed involuntary nature of such contracts, the "commodification" of
motherhood, and the feminist argument that surrogacy is akin to
prostitution. Posner anticipates and preempts each of these arguments.
45
Children would not be worse off under a regime of enforcement of the
surrogacy contract. Posner asks whether a half-adopted child derives a
net disutility from life? Also, the lack of enforcement does not drive
couples into the market of hard-to-place adoption children. Whether
poor and desperate women would find themselves in a position where
surrogacy is a final option for survival is doubtful. Empirical data on the
present situation presents surrogate mothers as mature middle class
41
women who already have children.
II. FAMILY, SEXUALITY, AND THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Due to the affinity and occasional methodological synergy between
economic theory and liberal thinking, several criticisms of economic
analysis of family law have been raised indistinctly against both strands of
literature. In discussing the libertarian perspective on issues related to
family and sex, such as abortion, surrogate motherhood, rape (including
date rape and marital rape), incest, battered wives, divorce and
pornography,47 much of the literature focuses on the ideal benchmark of
freedom of contract. This benchmark provides a hypothetical guideline
on what people should be free to do in the absence of uncompensated
48
costs on third parties. When transactions costs are high, the law should
44. See Richard A. Epstein, A Contractual Analysis of Surrogacy, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2305 (1995); Michael J. Trebilcock and Rosamin Keshvani, The Role of
Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41 U. TOR. L.
J. 533 (1991).
45. In the present section we will only address those objections that are
consequentialist (see supra note 38). Objections of symbolic nature are discussed
in Section 6.
46. For references to this data, see Surrogacy, supra note 21, at 25. Posner
also briefly examines the opinion in the famous Baby M case, 109 N.J. 396 (1987).
He maintains that the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning is highly deficient
and indicates a hostility to markets.
47. SEX AND REASON, supra note 23; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (1996).
48. For an important criticism of Posner's theory of sexuality in relation to the
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try to impose the deal that parties would have struck in the absence of
such costs. This approach offers clear answers for divorce and surrogate
motherhood; it does not work as well with rape, incest and pornography,
and it hardly provides any useful guideline for the case of abortion.
In economic terms, divorce can be analyzed as terminating the marital
contract. The issue that the law seeks to solve is the determination of the
conditions for such termination and the choice of proper remedy.
Regarding the issue of divorce, hypothetical contractarian theories
provide a viable framework for identifying the conditions for the
termination of a marriage. Like most contractarian theories, however,
this approach uses a hypothetical majoritarian criterion for the choice of
default rules applicable to all members of a community.
In the specific context of marriage and divorce, however, the use of
majoritarian default rules may appear problematic. The option of
unilateral termination of marriage, while possibly congenial to the
aspirations of the majority of individuals in society, may, in the view of
others, empty the institution of the family of one essential attribute. The
need to balance the aspirations of those who value long-term stability and
view indissolubility as a necessary condition for mutual commitment and
those who believe in the desirability of divorce remains a most contested
matter.
According to Posner, the proper perspective is to look at marriage as a
partnership and to reallocate the assets contributed by each partner. For
example, courts should consider women who support their husbands
through professional school as partial owners of the degree conferred, and
thus award more alimony as an installment repayment. This principle
results in a fair distribution of assets and a standard that judges can follow
fairly easily.
While aware of the limits of economic analysis in formulating policy
propositions on legal issues involving moral values, Posner further
elaborates some interesting propositions concerning rape and
pornography. In his view, these social problems are simple in theory, but
they involve complicated issues that cannot be answered through
economic analysis. In a simple economic analysis, rape parallels theft as a
coerced taking with low transaction costs. 49 In these cases, the law
consequently requires consent, or bargaining. The difficulty arises from
evidentiary problems in rape. It is often hard to know when consent has
Human and the non-instrumentalist perception of sexual relations in the Catholic
and natural law approach, see George, supra note 29 (arguing that Posner fails to
truly address the challenge of noninstrumental rationality).
49. SEX AND REASON, supra note 23, at 182-83, 393-94.
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been given. In rape, there is much uncertainty about third party effects.
Understanding what the actual issues are make the problems easier to
analyze. It is interesting to note that even though feminists are skeptical
of an economic analysis of these issues, many of them have implicitly
adopted one. Feminists who suggest that obtaining sex by false pretense
is like the crime of fraud and should be punished as such (but less than
forcible rape) are implicitly embracing an economic model of social
interaction." Posner further analogizes pornography to pollution -
voluntary exchange that may have uncompensated third-party effects,
such as gradual contamination of the norms of conduct in the general
community or the possible unconscious incitement of consumers to
commit rape or other sexual crimes."
While economics may pinpoint family and gender legal issues and
provide some answers, abortion is one of those social dilemmas that
cannot be solved through economic analysis." There is a simple
libertarian solution to abortion only if one does not consider the fetus's
utility. Without considering the interest of the fetus, the mother should
be entitled to abort, subject to the father's permission if an implicit or
explicit contract makes the fetus a joint asset. However, if the fetus is a
member of society whose welfare counts, such a contract has third party
effects and may not be presumed to be wealth maximizing. Likewise, if
one recognizes the sanctity of life and the limits of any social policy in the
face of such supreme value, no insight can be derived from economic
analysis or libertarian ideologies.
Since the decision to believe in the supreme value of life from the time
of conception and the decision to include the utility of the fetus in the
social welfare calculation is a moral one, libertarians and economists have
nothing to say on the matter of abortion.
A. Of Externalities and Privity in Contracts
One of the most commonly established objections against the
application of economics to matters of family, as described in the previous
section, is the fact that if affects non-parties. Third parties are not fully
accounted for in the calculus of the individual decision-makers, or so it is
argued. For instance, the proposed experiment for adoption deregulation
is dismissed by some because the welfare of the babies to be sold is not
50. Id. at 425.
51. Id. at 351-382.
52. For an illustration of the magnitude of complexity of this issue, see id. at
271-90.
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sufficiently guarded. 3 In the previous section we addressed Posner's
factual disagreement on this argument. This section takes a closer look at
the theoretical premise of this externality argument.
In the first part of the nineteenth century, Anglo-American common
law often relied on notions of privity to address the various issues of third-
party effects in private contracts. The widespread belief of both
economists and lawyers was that any contract which was in the interest of
both parties had to be in the interest of society at large. The underlying
confidence in such harmony of individual interests, was challenged by
early-twentieth century welfare theorists. These thinkers argued that
private agreements often have harmful effects on third parties, and that it
is, therefore, consistent with economic theory to. promote legal
intervention for the regulation and possible prohibition of socially
undesirable contracts. These ideological premises are the origin of much
modern legislation purposefully interfering with freedom of contract. 4
According to the economic definition, negative externalities are Pareto-
relevant costs imposed on non-consenting third parties outside of the
voluntary mechanism of the marketplace. In the presence of externalities,
third parties' preferences are not captured in the balance of costs and
benefits of the individual transaction. This implies that, even if both
parties to a particular contract benefit from it, the contract may impose
external costs on individuals who had no opportunity to participate in the
bargaining process. The economic notion of externalities is only partially
addressed by the legal notion of privity, according to which no rights or
obligations can be imposed on subjects who are not parties to the
contract. A large number of economic externalities remain outside the
grasp of legal issues of privity.5 Economic theory warns that, whenever
the effects generated by private agreements fall on third parties who have
not participated in the formation of the contract, the allocation of
resources may diverge from the ideal equilibrium implied by a model
where all benefits and costs are captured in the exchange.56 The relative
53. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 30.
54. This intellectual phenomenon did not escape Max Weber's sociological
insight when he observed: "Freedom of contract once existed ... in spheres in
which it is no longer prevalent or in which it is far less prevalent than it used to
be." MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 669 (1978) (Translation of MAX
WEBER, WIRTSCHAFF UND GESELLSCHAFT. GRUNDRISS DER VERSTEHENDEN
SOZIOLOGIE, 4th ed., 1956).
55. For an illuminating historical overview of the notion of privity in English
law, see VERNON V. PALMER, THE PATHS TO PRIVITY, THE HISTORY OF THIRD
PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS AT ENGLISH LAW (1992).
56. Known as "efficiency," this normative concept is often dismissed by
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lack of reach of the Pareto criterion of welfare is most evident in this
setting.57 According to its definition, the Pareto criterion will not be met if
an exchange has made someone better off while making others worse off.
Activities that may somehow offend a third party's sense of taste, or even
agreements that arouse envy in others, may possibly qualify as activities
that generate negative externalities. Pushing the Paretian logic to its
extreme, the existence of externalities would provide a sweeping
justification for banning or constraining private agreements, and freedom
of contract would largely be at an end. There is equal reason for
reservation with regard to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of potential
compensation, since it would entail balancing the external costs to third
parties against the benefits to the immediate parties to the contract.
While this criterion may enhance the individual autonomy of the parties
by permitting them to exercise their choices within the limits allowed by a
Kaldor-Hicks test of potential compensation, it may well diminish the
negative freedom of third parties who suffer the external effects of the
contract.
The problem is the elusiveness of the notion of externalities, one of the
most ill-defined concepts in welfare economics, perhaps analogous to the
equally ambiguous concept of harm in liberal political theory. 9 According
to Michael Trebilcock, the crucial task is that of distinguishing between
relevant and irrelevant externalities in welfare terms, and to define, in
liberal terms, the harm which one may justifiably impose on others. In
economists taking a subjective or Austrian approach. See Jack Wiseman, General
Equilibrium or Market Process: An Evaluation, in JACK WISEMAN, COST, CHOICE
AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 221 (1989):
In contrast, the Austrian approaches normative judgement by way of
methodological individualism and subjectivism. There is no objective
entity called "output," no way of measuring aggregate welfare, e.g. by
,adding up' observed prices (which are disequilibrium prices anyway).
The social relevance of the market lies in its mobilization of scattered
information, and the interesting normative issues concern such matters as
individual plan-coordination, the modification of expectations by market
experience, and the contribution of disequilibrium prices to improved
anticipation by way of entrepreneurial discovery.
57. Cf. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further,
100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law
and Economics Movement. Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and
Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1991).
58. Id. at 58.
59. TREBILCOCK, supra note 10, at 58-59. Charles K. Rowley forcefully
argued in this sense in the Foreword to STEVEN N. S. CHEUNG, THE MYTH OF
SOCIAL COST (I.E.A., 1978).
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this setting, Trebilcock introduces the notion of Pareto-relevant
externalities, which he defines as deviations from an attainable optimum.6
With an implied reference to a Coasian framework of bargaining,
Trebilcock seems to allow for the conclusion that all Pareto-relevant
externalities are self-curing in the market. Pareto-irrelevant externalities
are those which impose costs which are lower than the expenditure that
would be necessary for their removal. The point obviously raises public
choice concerns as to the political difficulties of addressing externality
problems through public remedies. Quoting from Carl J. Dahlman,
Michael Trebilcock argues that, in the presence of Pareto-irrelevant
externalities, legal intervention could only be justified on the basis of the
rather formidable assumption that governments can reduce the
transaction costs that inhibit exchanges, or miraculously find a better way
61than markets to achieve an optimal allocation of resources.
B. Of Commodities and Incommensurables
A different kind of claim heard in the debate on the literature
described above, relates to the permissible limits to the extrapolation of
economic concepts to so-called non-monetizable goods such as family
values62 and the alleged detrimental effects of valuation on an economic
basis. The objection of non-commensurability adopts the idea that not all
goods and all values can be measured by some common yardstick.
Although economists realize that many of the values inherent in family
related matters are intangibles that have nonpecuniary importance, they
63treat these preferences as if they could be monetarized. Measurement
and valuation of non-pecuniary goods under economic analysis would
thus be imperfect and most likely to be undercompensatory.
60. Id. at 59; Francesco Parisi, Review Essay: Autonomy and Private Ordering
in Contract Law, 1 EUR. J. L. & EcoN. 213-27 (1994).
61. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 141,
155-156 (1979).
62. See William J. Goode, Comment. The Economics of Nonmonetary Values,
in THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE? CHILDREN
AND HUMAN CAPITAL (1974), at 345.
63. On the claim that human values are plural, diverse and incommensurable,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in the Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 779 (1994). For other treatments of the issue of commensurability-the idea
that all goods and all values can be measured by some common yardstick, see
Margaret J. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993);
Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 785 (1994).
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As Wendy J. Gordon claims, "[O]ur morality has several, non-
commensurable strains within it." The dichotomy within the self is one
that needs to decided between choices of "consequential" or
"deontologic nature." Gordon provides the example of being faced with
the option of torturing a child in order to save the rest of the world of all
harm. The consequential component of our moral thinking cares about
the number of people that will be injured under each decision. By
contrast, the "deontologic" component refers to the component that will
have nothing to do with hurting the child.64
While, according to some, the latter may override the former in many
decisions of personhood, it must be argued that it is important to better
understand the consequentialist factualities of the choices open to us.
Furthermore, if one were to agree that social choice actually involves a
trade off between both commensurable and intrinsic values, it becomes
important to have a clear understanding of the consequences that are
brought about under the decisions that we are called to make.65
A different line of criticism stems from the fact that even if one
measures all values along a single economic matrix, the consequences of
such action would be unwanted. Commodification, attaching prices to all
goods and values, would be degrading to humanity and would erode many
of the moral values in society. According to these scholars, evaluation of
all values on a pecuniary basis is a priori intolerable and should be
rejected regardless of its purpose.
The estimated impact of law on family norms is a centerpiece in this
debate. Indeed some others, most notably Cass. R. Sunstein, have held
66that legal rules are preference shaping. From that it is of course just a
64. Wendy J. Gordon, Norms of Communication and Commodification, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2321, 2338 (1996).
65. But see id. at 2339: "In Realms where nonmonetary and antimonetary
norms play a strong role, it is not the best use of scholarly energy to assume that a
law which alters monetary payoffs will necessarily have significant behavioral
effects."
66. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1129 (1986). Sunstein discusses the preference shaping effect of legal
rules, presenting them as a case against treatment of private preferences as the
basis for social choice. Sunstein lists a number of distortions at the origin of
private preferences (e.g., endowment effects, adaptive preferences, intra-personal
collective action problems, etc.) that offer an opportunity for collective action that
decides on ends rather than to simply implement all preferences, including these
"distorted private preferences." See also MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES 69 (1996) (discussing how context supposedly influences preference
structures, arguing that value might vary according to the context of current
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small step to the argument of commodification. Will the attachment of
prices to all values and goods trigger a downward spiral of degradation of
personhood and the sense community?" Posner is skeptical of the alleged
impact of legal rules on underlying norms and attitudes in society, such as
the sense of community, altruism, etc.68 In the vision of Posner, a price
increase for the seller will lead more mothers to put their babies up for
adoption, without significantly altering social norms. As Posner puts it,
social norms are a consequence of "millions of years of evolution rather
than of such minor cultural details as the precise scope of the market
principle in a particular society." 69 The effect of legal rules on the values
must be very limited. In the context of the enforceability of contract of
surrogate motherhood, Posner refers to less countries with less
commodification and notes that people in these societies do not appear to
be less selfish than Americans.7°
C. The Uses and Criticisms of the Efficiency Criterion in Legal
Analysis
Alternative approaches in the economic analysis of law can be
distinguished by whether they are used positively or normatively. Having
determined that law and economics is an effective tool for analysis of
existing laws, many attorneys and judges are using economic analysis of
the law to an increasing degree. If used correctly, this analysis can have a
powerful effect in ensuring better judicial results. Critics of this analysis
often cite problems in "law and economics" when their critiques should
be more constructively redirected against the misuses of economics in the
ownership or absence of ownership).
67. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 66; Radin argues against
combining a right to exclude with a right of alienability with regard to so-called
"incommensurables," such as babies and body parts. According to Radin, such
reductionist "commodification" conflicts with humanist values and degrades the
notion of personhood, i.e., individuals will come to see themselves as simple
commodities that can be bought and sold on the market. For a version of this
argument with regard to children in a deregulated market for babies, see Frankel
and Miller, supra at note 30, 102-103 (explicit pricing will lead people to view
children as commodities which will destroy the dignity and autonomy of infants).
68. Posner's response to these symbolic arguments can be found in Adoption
Regulation, supra note 19, 70-71 (puzzled by the willingness of the symbolic
opponents to perpetuate or avoid discussion of the detrimental effects of the
current system, simply on symbolic grounds).
69. Surrogacy, supra note 21, at 26.
70. Id. at 26-27.
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71legal process.
Posner endorses a scientific approach which uses economics to study
objectively the legal system and the behavior it regulates. Posner believes
that positive economic analysis is immune to most abuse and misuse
because it is merely used to explain or predict the incentives which guide
individuals and institutions under alternative legal rules.
Posner acknowledges that normative economic analysis, i.e., the use of
economics to argue for what law should be, is susceptible to criticism. On
the other hand, he notes that while economic analysis assesses the costs
and benefits of a proposed rule, it is the non-economic weighting of the
economic factors which is vulnerable to subjective ideology.
One common misperception about the economic analysis of law is that
it always uses economic rhetoric. The primary hypothesis advanced by
positive economic analysis of law is the notion that efficiency is the
predominant factor shaping the rules, procedures and institutions of the
common law. Posner contends that efficiency is a defensible criterion in
the context of judicial decision-making because "justice" considerations,
for which there is no social consensus, introduce unacceptable ambiguity
into the judicial process. The mere fact that non-economic rhetoric
dominates judicial opinions does not indicate that basic economic
concepts such as profit maximization and marginal costs are not implicitly
followed in judicial reasoning. 2
In arguing for positive use of economics, Posner is not saying that there
are no normative economic applications. In fact, law and economics often
have many objective things to say that affect normative analysis of policy.
Posner offers crime as an example. Positive law and economics can help
explain and predict how various punishments will affect the behavior of
criminals. It might determine that a certain sanction is more likely to
deter a certain crime. While this analysis does not by itself mean that the
law should be adopted, it can be used to influence normative analysis on
71. Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 281 (1979).
72. Posner notes that the problem can also work the other way around. Judge
Sneed's opinion in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 5-1 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) is an
example of a judge misapplying economic analysis. The judge used economic
rhetoric incorrectly. However, he still ended up reaching the correct decision.
The important point to note is that economic rhetoric does not always reach the
right reasons, and the intuition of judges is often supported by more detailed
economic analysis. In this way, Oppen is an example of how efficiency is a
powerful force molding the common law, even when described in different
rhetoric. See Posner, supra note 71.
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whether the law would be beneficial to society. Thus, the proper
application of law and economics not only results in a better
understanding of the law as it exists now, but it also creates an analytical
framework that helps one make better normative choices of legal rules.
D. Efficiency, Morality and Posner's Theory of Justice
Although adherence to any particular normative theory of law is not
necessary to appreciate the potential added value of positive economic
analysis, Posner has gone to great lengths to advocate his own preferred
normative economic theory of law: The criterion of wealth maximization.
Under wealth maximization principles a transaction is desirable if it
increases the sum of all tangible and intangible goods and services
available to society.73
In spite of Posner's defense of wealth maximization, he does not argue
that it should replace morality. However, he does contend that wealth
maximization is generally the most principled ground for allocating legal
73. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Richard A.
Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). For critical discussion of the wealth
maximization criterion as an ancillary paradigm for justice, see Whitney
Cunningham, Note: Testing Posner's Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization, 81
GEO. L. J. 141 (1992) (holding that wealth maximization produces ethically
unacceptable results), but compare Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics
and Legal Theory, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) (Posner sees wealth maximization
as distinct from utilitarianism and argues that the objections to utilitarianism do
not apply to wealth maximization); Jules Coleman, Book Review: The Normative
Bias of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's The Economics
of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (discussing the shortcomings of the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion while arguing that wealth maximization is a form of Kaldor-Hicks under
disguise); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth
Maximization, 1999 Wisc. L. REV. 687 (1999) (discussing wealth maximization by
analogy to the metamorphoses); Richard Schmalbeck, Book Review: The Justice
of Economics: An Analysis of Wealth Maximization as a Normative Goal, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 488 (refuting the basis for wealth maximization as an ethical
basis); Annalise E. Acorn, Valuing Virtue: Morality and Productivity in Posner's
Theory of Wealth Maximization, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 167 (1993) (examining wealth
distribution's claim of interrelation between materiality and moral virtue, while
dismissing the analogy with virtue in Calvinist ideology). For product-failure
disclaimer with regard to this section see Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to
Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 191 (1990), which contains the following closing
statement: "7-11 sells freedom (which you can find in its Slurpees). Pepsi brings
you the downfall of the Berlin Wall. And normative legal thought guides the
development of the law." Id.
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claims to society's resources.
Legal scholars argued that Posner's economic theory of justice
promotes "disrespect for individuals," is "indeterminative and elitist,"
and "can hardly be viewed as anything other than amoral, if not
immoral., 74 According to Posner, these critiques miss the mark, in that
they treat the methodology of law and economics as a political theory.75
Indeed, Posner has argued that wealth maximization is the best normative
and positive theory of common law rights and remedies, but never
suggested that wealth maximization should be the only social value or
principle of justice.
In this context, Posner describes himself as a "pragmatic economic
libertarian., 76 He is libertarian in that he is suspicious of public
intervention and favors small government. He uses economic theory to
define what he sees as the appropriate role of the government to
intervene and correct serious market failures. He is pragmatic in the
sense that he does not derive these free-market views from dogmatic or
philosophical underpinnings. Instead, he uses wealth maximization to
operationalize his economic libertarianism. By stripping away "moral"
distributive considerations and predispositions about the paternalistic role
of government, wealth maximization provides a powerful analytical tool
for deriving a system of optimal government. Posner does not contend
that wealth maximization should override moral concerns, but he argues
that it is especially useful for guiding common law adjudication in which
judges are reluctant to decide controversies on a distributive basis.
Wealth maximization sometimes runs contrary to moral guides such as
natural rights. The natural rights perspective views society as a compact
in which people surrender just enough of their own natural liberties as is
necessary to protect everyone else's equal natural liberties. Posner
believes that because the notion of natural rights can be expanded so
readily, it is too unstable a foundation to build upon. He also believes
that it is fundamentally anti-democratic because it holds that the more
rights people have, the smaller the permissible scope of public policy
deliberation.
Many of the arguments made by natural rights proponents rely on
examples for which there is moral consensus. Posner points out that the
74. See R.P. Malloy, The Merits of the Smithsian Critique: A Final Word on
Smith and Posner, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 266 (1988).
75. Richard A. Posner, The Ethics of Wealth Maximization: Reply to Malloy,
36 U. KAN. L. REV. 261 (1988).
76. Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics is Moral, 24 VAL. L. REV. 166
(1990).
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power of natural rights' moral discourse runs out when one faces
controversial moral issues. It is at this point that an analytical tool is
needed to frame policy questions. For Posner, wealth maximization
allows one to get to the costs and benefits of a proposed action, reduce
factual uncertainty, and identify any remaining moral issue in a more
rigorous fashion.
E. Private Autonomy in the Family Sphere
Notwithstanding the basic principle of freedom of contract, several
generations of lawyers have been busy elaborating all sorts of legal
doctrines that allow the courts to utilize normative criteria of fairness in
their decision-making process. In these situations, judicial and statutory
intervention is not justified by notions of technical externalities or lack of
free consent. These doctrines address situations in which the parties
freely entered into the agreement, and the relevant effects of the contract
remain confined within their individual spheres. Many of these
restrictions to the general freedom of contract have been created on
grounds of fairness, equity and social welfare. In many of these instances,
social intervention relies on elusive protectionist grounds. The
patronizing is rationalized as an attempt to prevent people from harming
themselves or as an encouragement to be more considerate of collective
77
social values. The idea is that individuals should have less freedom to
make mistakes than they currently have.6
77. On the issue, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1778 (1976), where contract law is described
as an ideal context for judicially created altruistic order. For a critical appraisal of
this notion, see Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92
YALE L.J. 763 (1983). On the general theme, see William H. Clune, Courts and
Legislatures as Arbitrators of Social Change, 93 YALE L.J. 763 (1984), reviewing
M.A. REBELL-A.R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING AND THE COURTS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL AcrivisM (1982).
78. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE
L.J. 763 (1983) ("[L]imitations of this sort restrict the contractual freedom of
those involved by depriving them of the right to decide whether their voluntary
arrangements shall be legally binding .... Restraints of this sort aim to protect
people from themselves by limiting their capacity to make enforceable agreements
of various kinds."). On the theme of protectionist intervention in the law, see
Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in R. WASSERSTROM, MORALITY AND THE LAW 107
(1971); Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105 (1971); Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L.
REV. 563 (1982).
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The whole idea of protectionist judicial activism clearly abandons the
premises of normative individualism, and introduces the opposite claim
that voluntary and freely chosen contractual arrangements cannot be
relied upon as conclusive indicia of Pareto-optimal exchanges. An ex post
facto screening of fairness and social desirability becomes necessary for
the protection of the contracting parties and society at large. In this
setting, the requirement of valuable consideration, which renders informal
gratuitous promises unenforceable; the doctrine of unconscionability,
which is used to protect uninformed consumers from the consequences of
their own bad bargains; and the judicial scrutiny of releases of personal
liability, are prominent illustrations of such protectionist intervention in
the law of contracts.
Law and economics scholars are quick to note that the justification of
protectionist and social intervention gives rise to theoretical difficulties.79
Some of these difficulties are the long-term effects of prolonged
governmental action, which may be perceived as creating vested rights
and protected expectations for individual members of society.8 °
Paradoxically, if contract law is used inclusively to address distributional
and social issues, the legal and social perception of property rights and
individual privileges may be irreversibly altered. For example, if the
introduction of rent control or minimum wage laws initially amounted to
an imposition of not-bargained-for costs on homeowners and employers,
the repeal of those statutes after many years might be perceived as
infringing upon protected social expectations of tenants and workers
alike. According to this logic, the public interest in the regulation of
private contracts extends well beyond the problem of technical
externalities. The limits imposed on freedom of contract become part of
the broader set of governmental devices used to address social problems
such as affordable housing and subsistence wages for indigent
individuals." There is inherent in this a danger of undisciplined notions of
externalities that provides a basis for constraining almost every
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contractual freedom."' Almost any market exchange could be challenged
by governmental regulation, since in almost any situation there are
potential externalities to the diffuse public interest. In too many
situations, the response would, thus, amount to legislative or judicial
interference with the contractual freedom of individuals. Contracts would
no longer belong to the market, and every private agreement would be
subject to the potential screening of a governmental or judicial authority. 3
CONCLUSION
Posner's various law and economics papers often unveil intriguing
paradoxes and he convincingly shows the value of economics even in the
context of alternative ideological conceptions of law. Whatever the
normative goals pursued, economic analysis is valuable in determining
how to best reach them. Posner's economic papers often expose some of
the unintended consequences of legal intervention, revealing that the
chosen rules may not necessarily produce the desired effects.
Furthermore, the traditional debate over normative issues is often shown
to ignore the underlying economic nature of human action. A searching
eye towards these issues can help clarify the debate and point to a better
resolution. Economic analysis of law has significant value for anyone who
wants to view legal and political issues in a logical and informed way.
Rather than scratching the surface, Posner shows that an economic
approach can provide valuable insight into matters regardless of whether
they are generally considered "economic" or not. In this vain, Posner has
amply shown that rational choice models can explain much of the variance
across time and cultures in the family norms and practices. The work of
Posner in this field has, more than that of any other scholar in the
discipline of economic analysis of law, opened up inquiry into subjects and
issues that demand our attention and place it on the agenda of readers all
over the world.
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note 10, at 58-77.
83. Id. at 268. The distorting effects of such restrictions of individual liberties
are eloquently discussed in the final chapter entitled "Autonomy and Welfare,"
where Trebilcock advances the hope that the market be truly accepted "as an
engine, not an enemy, of social as well as economic progress." Id.
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